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IN THE SUP'REME COURT 
OF T'HE ST'A TE o~F UTAH 
ARCH J)~\~[ CONSTRUCTORS, 
P etitvonevr, 
-vs.-
STATE TAX COM~liSSION OF 
UTAH, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 9384 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
NATlJRE OF THE CASE 
This is an original proceeding brought under Rule 
65 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to revie'v 
the action of the State Tax Commission under is its De-
cision No. 190. The petitioner Arch Dam Constructors 
is using an access road in connection with the construc-
tion of thP Flaming Gorge Dam. Petitioner contends 
that the aeress road is not a "'highvva)r" 'vithin the Inean-
ing of Section -!1-1-19, r~.C.A. 1953, and that it is not 
required, therefore, to pay registration and license fees 
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on vehicles using the road. The respondent State Tax 
Commission, by its Decision 190, held that the access 
road ;is a "highway'', "'~ithin- the 1neaning of that section, 
and that the petitioner must pay the registration and 
license fees,._. The only question to be det~rn1ined by this 
court, therefore, is whether the access road is a "high-
way" \vithin the meaning of the statute. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts were stipulated by counsel and are not in 
dispute. The stipulation \vas recited in full by the Com-
mission in its decision. It is not voluminous, and to make 
the same readily available to the Court, \Ve quote the find-
ings in full : 
"1. The Arch Dam Construetors, a joint ven-
ture engaged in construction of Flaming Gorge 
Dam, use an access road in the vicinity of the 
Fla:q1ing Gorge Dam!site for purposesjncident to 
the · construction of Flaming Gorge Dam. The 
construction of the dan1 is being accomplished by 
the Arch Da1n Constructors pursuant to a contract 
with the United States of America, Department of 
the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation. 
"2. The access road used by the Arch Dam 
·Constructors originates approximately 2,000 feet 
north of the Utah border in the State of Wyoming, 
at a junction \Yith ''Tyo1ning State Highway No. 
530, and fron1 that point extends in a general 
southeasterlY direction to the town of Dutch John, 
Daggett Co~nty, Utah, and fron1 thence to the 
Flaming Gorge Dam site, having an entire length 
of 17.1Iniles. Certain vehicles owned by the Arch 
Dam Constructors use the entire length of the ac-
cess road as above mentioned for the purpose of 
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transporting materials, supplies and personnel, 
but the primary use of the aeeess road is from the 
aggregate plant, located four miles south of the 
lTtah state line, for the purpose of hauling aggre-
gate from that plant to the Flaming Gorge Dam 
site. 
"3. Construction of the access road was corn-
rnenced by the Bureau of Reclamation pursuant 
to a contract with the W angsgaard Construction 
(~ompany of Logan, Utah, whereby the grading 
and gravel surfacing of the portion of the road 
from the Utah-Wyoming border to Dutch John 
was completed. That contract also included con-
struction of a timber bridge across the Green 
River, and asphalt surfacing of about eight miles 
of the access road from Dutch John toward the 
Utah-Wyoming line. The Arch Dan1 Constructors 
completed the asphalt surfacing pursuant to its 
contract with the United States, from the point 
where Wangsgaard ended its asphalt surfacing to 
the Utah-Wyoming state line, also being a dis-
tance of approximately eight miles. The Arch 
Dam ·Constructors have now spent approximately 
$1,130,000 in constructing, and approximately 
$81,000 in maintaining the access road, and are 
spending approximately $1,800 per month main-
taining the access road. 
"4. The population of Dutch John is ex-
pected to reach 2,500 persons at the peak of con-
struction, according to an estimate by the Bureau 
of Reclamation, but the maximum population thus 
far has been only 780 persons and the Arch Dam 
Constructors estiinate that the maximum popula-
tion "'"i 11 not exceed 1,300 peTsons at the peak of 
construction. 
"5. The access road serves as a connecting 
link between \;r ernal and ~f anila, although 1Ttah 
IIigh,vay -t--1- (not travPrsing the access road), ad-
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mittedly a public highway, also connects those two 
Utah communities. 
"6. The access road crosses land owned and 
withdrawn or reserved by the United States of 
America, since part of the road crosses sections 
of the Ashley National Forest and the remainder 
crosses land \vithdrawn by the Bureau of Reclam-
ation for purposes related to the construction of 
the Flaming Gorge Dam and Power Plant. 
"7. The Contract between the Arch Dam 
Constructors and the United States of America 
requires the cotractor to keep the access road open 
for general public use: 
'The road [access] is the only adequate 
connection bet,veen the Flaming Gorge com-
munity and the nearest established communi-
ties, and the contractor's use of the road shall 
not infringe on or imperil the free public 
use of the road for normal travel purposes.' 
"8. Paragraphs 50 and 51 of the same con-
tract oblige the contractor to maintain necessary 
barricades, lights, danger signals and signs on the 
access road for the safety of the public. 
"9. In 1958 the Bureau of Reclamation re-
quested the State High,Yay Patrol to take jurisdic-
tion of the access road for the administration and 
enforcement of state higlnYay la\YS and regula-
tions on the aeeess road for the benefit and pro-
tection of the general public using the access road. 
The State High\\Tay Patrol consented to undertake 
such administration and enforcement, and a High-
\vay Patrnhnan has been assigned to the area. 
~' 10. In constructing the access road, Utah 
State engineers made available striping equip-
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ment and consulted with engineers for the l~ureau 
of Reclarnation (but did not consult with or supply 
any equipment to the Arch Dain ·Constructors), 
such consultation being for the purpose of insur-
ing that the access road would be properly marked, 
signed, striped and zoned for speed in accordance 
with the safety standards of the State of Utah; 
all of which was to insure safe driving to those 
using the access road and to assist in the investi-
gation and reporting of accidents occuring on 
the road. The primary use of the access road is 
by personnel ernployed by the Arch Dam Con-
structors and by the Bureau of Reclantation, al-
though the road is open to general public use. 
"11. The State Road Commission asserted 
jurisdiction over the access road and demanded 
compliance 'vi th statutory restrictions as to size, 
weight, and load limitations which are applicable 
to the highways of the State of Utah. Pursuant 
to said demand, on l\Iay 25, 1960, the Arch Dam 
Constructors applied to the Road Commission for 
the issuance of a special over-weight permit in 
connection "··i th the use of their vehicles on the 
Flarning Gorge access road. That request was 
granted. The application for such permit by the 
Arch Darn Constructors 'vas not an acknowledge-
rnent by then1 of the State Road Commission's au-
thority over the road, but was for the purpose of 
complying with the requirements of the Road 
Commission and thus insuring continued construc-
tion at the dam site, until such time as Arch Dam 
Constructors could secure a legal determination 
of the status of the access road. 
''12. The lTnited States Bureau of Reclama-
tion has indicated that it intends to permit the 
public to use the road until 1962 or 1963, when 
certain portions of the access road "Till l }r in-
undated as a result of impounding "rater behind 
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Flaming Gorge Dam. The access road has now 
been used by the general public for approximately 
three years. 
"13. The access road is maintained in all 
respects at the expense of the Arch Dam Con-
structors, pursuant to its contract with the United 
States, and no part of the access road was con-
structed by the State of Utah or any political 
subdivision thereof, and no part of the access road 
is being maintained by the State of lTtah or any 
political subdivision thereof. 
"14. There has been no official dedication of 
the access road as a public highway by any official 
act of the State of lJtah or any political subdivi-
sion thereof; nor has there been any official dedi-
cation of the access road as a public highway 
by the lfnited States of America or any agency 
or subdivision thereof; nor has there been any 
official grant or conveyance of any highway or 
right of way from the United States or any of its 
agencies or politic-al subdivisions to the State of 
Ut-ah or any of its political subdivisions. 
"15. The State Tax Commission has notified 
the Arch Dam ~Constructors that they are liable 
for registration and license fees by virtue of Sec-
tion 41-1-19, lT.C.A. 1953, on all of their vehicles 
using the access road, and the Arch Dam Con-
structors have paid the appropriate registration 
and license fees under protest and have brought 
the instant action to restrain and enjoin the Tax 
Commission from rollecting such registration and 
license fees." 
STATEl\1:ENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
SECTION 41-1-19 IMPOSES REGISTRATION AND LI-
CENSE FEES ONLY WHEN VEHICLES ARE USED UPON 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
HIGH\VAYS WHICH ARE (a) MAINTAINED AT PUBLIC 
EXPENSE, AND (b) OPEN TO THE PUBLIC AS A MA'TTER 
OF RIGHT. 
POINT II. 
THE ACCESS ROAD IS NOT MAINTAINED AT PUBLIC 
EXPENSE. 
POINT III. 
THE ACCESS ROAD IS NOT OPEN TO THE PUBLIC 
AS A MATTER OF RIGHT. 
(a) In Federal Lands, the Power of Congress is Exclusive 
and only through its Exercise in some Form can Rights Therein 
be Acquired. 
(b) Section 525, Title 16, U .S.C., Concerning Rights-of-
Way for Roads on N aional Forest Lands has not been Complied 
With. 
(c) There has been no Establishment of a Right in the 
Public to use the Road under Authority of Section 932 Title 43, , 
u.s.c. 
(d) The Contract Executed by the Bureau of Reclamation 
with Petitioner did not have the Effect of Granting to the Public 
Rights in Federal Land. 
(e) Even if the Utah Statutes Defining Public Roads and 
Private Roads were Applicable to Federal Land, this would not 
be a Public Road within the Utah statutes. 
POINT IV. 
TAX STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST 
THE STATE AND IN FAVOR OF THE TAXPAYER. 
_A_RGU~Ir~~·JT 
POINT I. 
SECTION 41-1-19 Il\IPOSES REGISTRATION AND LI-
CENSE FEES ONLY WHEN VEHICLES ARE USED UPON 
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HIGHWAYS WHICH ARE (a) MAINTAINED AT PUBLIC 
EXPE~TSE, AND (b) OPEN TO THE PUBLIC AS A MA'TTER 
OF RIGHT. 
Beyond dispute is the fact that not all roads are 
public highways and not all vehicles need to be registered 
and licensed. The problem in the instant case is simply 
one of determining which roads are exempt from the prO-
visions of Section 41-1-19, which provides: 
"Every n1otor vehicle, combination of ve-
hicles, trailer and semi ... trailer, when driven or 
moved upon a highway, shall be subject to regis-
tration and certificate of title provisions of this 
act .... " (Emphasis added.) 
The definitions of terms used in Chapter 1, Title 41, 
are found in Section 1, where highway is defined as: 
"The entire width between the property lines 
of every way or place of whatever nature or any 
part thereof open to the public as a matter of right 
for purposes of vehicular traffic." Section 41-1-1 
(bb). (En1phasis added.) 
Thus, by specific statutory derlaration, a "'highway" 
for the purpose of in1posing registration and license fees 
means a high\Yay open to the public as a matter of right. 
The meaning of the phrase "as a 1natter of right" pre-
sents no ambiguity. It sin1ply means that the general 
public must use thP road as a matter of legal right 
against the owner of the land. If the O"\\ller cannot legally 
enjoin the general public fron1 using the road, then the 
public uses the road as a matter of right, and the road 
is a highway within the meaning of Section 41-1-19. Con-
versely, if t hP owner of the land can legally enjoin the 
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general public from using the road, then the public does 
not use the road as a matter of right, and the road is not 
a highway within the meaning of Section -± l-1-19: 
"It is quite true, as suggested by the Attorney 
General, that a road or crossing may be public, 
although it is and can be used by a few persons 
only. It is, however, also true that under such 
ci rcu nzstances any one who has occasion to use the 
cross£ng can successfully complain of its obstruc-
tion and can require it to be kept open for passage . 
. . . " Ba1nberger El. R. Co. v. P. U. Comm., 59 
Utah 351, 362, 204 Pac. 314 (1922). 
Accord: J/ orris v. Bluut, 49 lTtah :2-1:3, 161 Pac. 1127 
(1916). 
The definition of this court is in har1nony \Yith con-
sistent pronouncements of other jurisdictions. American 
Jurisprudence, , .. ol. 25, Higlr\vays, SPction 136, presents 
this summary : 
"As already intimated, the rights and title of 
an abutting o'vner who owns the fee to the land 
over which a highway runs are subject and sub-
ordinate to the easement and servitude in favor of 
the public. While he, in common with other abut-
ting owners, may under certain circumstances 
temporarily obstruct the highway when reason-
ably necessary, he has no right to do anything 
in respect to it which will impair the safety of 
traveler:-;, or in any "'"ay interfere with the use of 
the way as a highway by the public, or to use it for 
any purpose 'vhich amounts to a perversion of it 
from the uses for which it was intended." 
This court has added a clarification hy stating that 
Hhigh,Yay," a~ used in Seet1on -±1-l-19 1:1eans "public 
high,vay.'' 
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"Be it noted that the Section 41-1-19 did not 
apply to all vehicles, but only those required to be 
registered. By Section 19, before a motor vehicle 
can be driven on a public highway, it must be 
registered." Jackson v. James, 97 Utah 41, 89 P. 
2d 235 (1939). (Emphasis added.) 
In perceiving no difference in meaning between 
"highway" and "public highway," this court finds sup-
port in a succinct statement in Black's Law Dictionary, 
(Fourth Ed., 1951), Highway, page 862: 
"It has been said that if the word 'highway' 
is given its customary meaning, the phrase 'pub-
lic highway' is an example of tautology - the 
needless or useless repetition of the same idea, 
of which the law seems to furnish so many illus-
trations. See Galloway v. Wyatt l\Ietal & Boiler 
Works, 181 So. 187 189 La. 837; Blashfield, Cyc. 
of Automobile Law and Pract., Perm. Ed., Sec-
tion 3." 
We believe that the above authorities establish that 
a "high"ray" \Yithin the meaning of Section -±1-1-19, 
U.C.A. (1953) is a road \vhich is open to the general pub-
lic under such conditions that if the O\\rner of the fee were 
to try to close or obstruct the road, the public could suc-
cessfully complain and require the owner to reopen it -
since only then is the use by the public "as a matter of 
right." 
Where a road is con1pleted and n1aintained at public 
expense, it generally \Yill be held to be a public higlnYay, 
and, conversely, \\'"here it is not maintained at public ex-
pense, this is a strong indicia that it is not a high,vay 
within the meaning of the statute. The lJtah statute does 
10 
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not expressly say so, but the iu1plieation is ~o clear as to 
leave littlP roorn for doubt. Not only did the Legislature 
contemplate financing the construction and n1aintenan(·e 
of highways 'vith public funds, but expressly provided 
that receipts from registration and license fees should 
be used for such purpose. C~hapter 8 of Title 27 deals with 
the classification, construction and maintenance of high-
\vays. Chapter 2 of Title 27 (Sections 17 and 18) provides 
for maintenance of Class B and Class ·C roads from the 
motor vehicle registration fund. Chapter 4 of Title 27 
(Sections 1 and 2) provides for the payment of interest 
on bonds and the creation of a rede1nption fund for bonds 
from the motor vehicle registration fund. Indeed, it goes 
'vithout saying, for it is eom1non knowledge, that public 
highways should be publicly maintained. 
This, again, is in con1plete accord with ''hornbook" 
defini.tions of "highways'' : 
~' [The prime essentials of a highway] are the 
right of common enjoyment on the one hand and 
the duty of public mai11tenance on the other.' 
Am. Jur., Volume 25, Highways, Section 2. (Em-
phasis added.) 
"[A highway is] a way open to the public at 
large without distinction, discrimination, or re-
striction, except such as is incident to regulations 
calculated to secure to the general public the 
largest practical benefit therefrom and enjoy-
ment thereof. Its prime essentials are the right 
of common enjoyment on the one hand, an.d the 
duty of pul)li:c nraintenance on the other. The term 
is generic, and includes all public roads and ways." 
Balleutine, La''r Dictionary (1948 Ed.), Highway, 
page 587. (Emphasis added.) 
11 
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"[A highway is] an easement acquired by the 
public in the use of a road or way for thorough-
fare. Bolender. v. Southern Michigan Telephone 
·Co., 182 Mich. 646, 148 N.W. 697, 700. A free and 
public roadway, or street; one which every person 
has the right to use. Abbott v. Duluth, C. C. Minn., 
104 F. 837. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Bennett, C:C.A. 
r,riss., 296 F. 436, 437. Its prime essentials are 
the right of common enjoyment on the one hand 
and the duty of pttblic maintenance on the other. 
Hildebrand v. Southern Bell Telephone & Tele-
graph Co., 219 N.C. 402, 14 S.E. 2d 252, 25-1, 255." 
Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth Ed., 1951), High-
way, Page 862. (Emphasis added.) 
It is, therefore, submitted that Section -±1-1-19 im-
poses registration and license fees only 'vhen vehicles 
are used on a road 'vhich is 1naintained at public expense 
and used by the general public as a matter of right. 
POINT II. 
THE ACCESS ROAD IS NOT MAINTAINED AT PUBLIC 
EXPENSE. 
There, of course, can be no factual issue concerning 
the fact that this access road is not maintained by the 
State of 1Ttah, for the parties have stipulated that: 
"The access road is 1naintained in all respects 
at the 0xpense of the ~\rrh Dan1 ,Constructors 
(petition(lr), pursuant to its ron tract 'Yith the 
United States, and no part of the access road 'vas 
constructed by the State of Utah or any political 
subdivision thereof, and no part of the arress road 
is being 1naintained by the State of Utah or any 
political subdivision thereof." (Para. 13, Findings 
of Fact.) 
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
H ••• The Arch Dam Constructors (petition-
er) have now spent approximately $1,130,000.00 in 
constructing, and approxin1ately $81,000.00 in 
maintaining the access road, and are spending ap-
proximately $1,800.00 per month maintaining the 
access road." (Para. 3, Finding of Fact.) 
~ince vehicle registration and license fees have been 
in1posed to construct and maintain public highways, and 
since this highway is not maintained by the State of Utah, 
vehicles used upon it should not be subject to registration 
and license fees. 
POINT III. 
THE ACCESS ROAD IS NOT OPEN TO THE PUBLIC 
AS A MATTER OF RIGHT. 
(a) In Federal Lands, the Power of Congress is Exclusive 
and only through its Exercise in some Form can Rights Therein 
be Acquired. 
It is admitted that the public is presently using the 
access road. But, of course, that is not the question. 
The question is whether such use can be sustained as a 
matter of right against the owner of the land. 
It is of primary importance to a de1termination of 
\Vhether the public is using this access road "as a matter 
of right'' to keep in mind the fact that the road is located 
upon federally o"\vned lands. It is equally important to 
note that all of the lands are 'vithdra""'n or reserved by 
the lTnited States of America for public use. Part of the 
access road eross()~ sections of the Ashle~., ~ n tional 
Forest and the remainder erosses lands ""'i~thdraw"n by 
13 
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the Bureau of Reclamation. The parties have stipulated 
as follows : · 
"The access road crosses land owned and 
withdrawn or reserved by the United States of 
America, since part of the road crosses sections 
of the Ashley National Forest and the remainder 
crosses land withdra,vn by the Bureau of Reclam-
ation for purposes related to the construction of 
the Flaming Gorge Dam and Power Plant." (Para-
graph 6 of the Findings.) 
The fact that the land traversed by the road is fed-
erall.Y. owned, and the further fact that the land is with-
drawn or reserved for public use are of critical import-
ance to the issue here to be determined, because rights 
against the federal government can only be acquired 
through a compliance with some act of Congress. In other 
words, under the property clause (Article IV, Section 3, 
Clause 2) of the United States Constitution, the power 
to control and dispose of federal land is vested in Con-
gress, and its power to grant or withhold rights in federal 
land is almost \\rithout limitation. The United States 
Supreme Court has so stated on numerous occasions. See, 
for example, Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954), 
wherein the Supreme Court said: 
"The power of Congress to dispose of any 
kind of property belonging to the United States 'is 
vested in Congress 'vithout li1nitation.' United 
States v. 1lfi.d1vest Oil Conlpa ny, 236 U.S. 459, 47 4: 
'For it must be borne in n1ind that Congress not 
only· has a legislative po\ver over the public do-
main, but it also exercises the powers of the pro-
prietor therein.' Congress 'may deal with such 
lands precisely as a private individual may deal 
14 
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with his farming property. It may sell or withhold 
them from sale.' Canzfield v. lJnited Stales, 1()7 
L1.S. 524; Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 536. 
l .T nited Staf.es v. San Francisco, 310 lJ.S. 16, 29-30: 
··Article 4, Section 3, Cl. 2 of the Constitution pro-
vides that 'The Congress shall have Power to dis-
pose of and make all needful Rules and Regula-
tions respecting the Territory and other Property 
belonging to the United States.' The power over 
the public land thus entrusted to Congress is \vith-
out limitations. 4And it is not for the courts to 
say how that trust shall be administered. That 
is for Congress to determine.' Un~te.d States v. 
Caifornia, 332 1T.S. 19, 27: 'We have said that the 
constitutional power of Congress (under Article 
IV, Sec. 3, Cl. 2) is without limitation. United 
States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29-30.'" 
Thus, before the State of Utah or the general pub-
lic may obtain "rights" in federally owned land, there 
must be some legislative enactment by Congress permit-
ting the acquisition of the rights. In Utah Power & 
Light Co. v. Tlnited States, 243 U.S. 389, 403 (1917), 
the Court noted the property clause of the United States 
Constitution, and said: 
"Repeated decisions of this court have gone 
upon the theory that the po\ver of Congress is 
exclusive and that only through its exercise in 
some fonn can rights in lands belonging to the 
1Jnited States be acquired." (Emphasis added.) 
This power to release, create or otherwise dispose 
of" rights" in property of the United States \vhich is thus 
vested in Congress and which must be exercised in some 
form by Congres~, ran not be exercised by subordinate 
officer~ of the l~nited State~~ unless the po,ver has been 
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delegated to them by Congress. Again, the United States 
Supreme Court has expressly so stated: 
''Power to release or otherwise dispose of 
the rights and property of the United States is 
lodged in the Congress by the Constitution, Art. 
4, Sec. 3, ·Clause 2. Subordinate officers of the 
United States are 'vithout power save only as it 
has been conferred upon them." Royal Indemnity 
Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289 (1941). 
The stipulation of facts indicates that the State has, 
at the request of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, patrol-
led the highway. (Para. 9, Findings.) But this is not 
the same thing as recognizing public rights in the land. 
As the United States Supreme Court has noted: 
". . . True, for many purposes a State has 
civil and criminal jurisdiction over lands within 
its limits belonging to the United States, but this 
jurisdiction does not extend to any matter that 
is not consistent with full power in the United 
States to protect its lands, to control their use and 
to prescribe in what manner others may acquire 
rights in them .... " Utah Pou·er & Light Co. v. 
United States, 2-!3 U.S. 389, 403 (1917). 
Accord: McKel'cey v. UnUed States, 260 lT.S. 353 
(1922); Canzfield v. United States, 167 l:.s. 518 (1897); 
Light v. [!nited States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911); and Gibson 
v. Choutea1t, 13 ''Tall. 92 (1872). 
Insofar as our rP~earch has disclosed, there are only 
two Congressional enact1nents 'Yhich n1ight have applca-
tion here. The first is Section 525, Title 16, lT nited States 
Code, which concerns the creation of rights-of-,vay for 
roads on national forest lands. The other is Section 932, 
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rritle -l-~~' {JnitP{l ~tatPS (~ode, whieh is a federal offer of 
a ri~ht-of-\vay for roads to the general public, but it ap-
plies only to lands • 'not reservt>d for public uses." 'Ve 
"·ill analyze both of these sections, but it i:s clear that any 
dedication of the access road to public use must be de-
rived from authority granted by Congress. 
(b) Section 525, Title 16, U.S.C., Concerning Rights-of-
Way for Roads on N aional Forest Lands has not been Complied 
With. 
The only relevant power granted by ·Congress to the 
executive branch to dispose of lands or create rights-of-
\vay on national forest land is found in Section 525, 
Title 16, United Stat~es Code. It provides: 
"In the form provided by existing la\v, the 
Secretary of the Interior may file and approve 
surveys and plats of any right-of-way for a wagon 
road, railroad, or other highway over and across 
any national forest, when in his judgment the 
public interests will not be injuriously affected 
thereby." 
The United States Supreme Court has said that the 
Secretary of the Interior, to satisfy the statute, must 
1nake a special determination to the effect that the public 
interests \Yill not be injuriously affected. Chicago Mil. 
& St. P. Ry. v. u~nited States, 244 U.S. 351 (1917). See 
also Sec. 2-!4.10 and 2-!4.1-l- (a and b), Code of Federal 
Regulations. This determination is personal to the Secre-
tary and Inay not be usurped by or delegated to some 
subordinate officer. ( lr ol. 39, Opinions of the Attorney 
General of the United States 373; Vol. 38, Opini·ons of 
the Attorney General of the United States, 474; Royal 
Indemnity Co. v. []nited States, 313 U.S. 289 (19-41). 
17 
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No attempt has been made by the Secretary of the 
Interior or by any subordinate officer to dedicate the 
access road under Section 525. Quite to the contrary, 
paragraph 14 of the Findings of Fact recites that there 
has been no: 
'' . . official dedication of the access road as 
a public highway by the United States of America 
or any agency or subdivision thereof; nor has 
there been any official grant or conveyance of any 
highway or right-of-way from the United States 
or any of its agencies or political subdivisions to 
the State of Utah or any of its political subdivi-
sions." 
It is thus respectfully subnutted that the public has 
not acquired any rights in the federal lands which are 
within the national forest reserve. 
(c) There has been no Establishment of a Right in the 
Public to use the Road under the Authority of -Section 932, Title 
43. 
The general statute under \vhich Congress has grant-
ed rights-of-way across open public domain is Section 
932, Title 32, U.S.C. This statute has been construed 
consistently as an offer of a right-of-,vay by the United 
States \v·hich can be accepted by the public or by the 
state in any manner \Yhirh is sufficient to otherwise es-
tablish a right-of-,yay under the la"T of the particular 
state. See, for exa1nplP, ·v· olu1ne 73, ·C.J.S., Public Lands, 
Section 85; 0-Sullirau r. Rro1rn, 171 Fed. 2d 199 (19:lS). 
There are t\Yo eoneluHiYe reason8 "·by the construc-
tion, main tenanre and U8~ of the arre~s road \Yill not 
constitute an aret\ptance of the federal offer under that 
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statute. First, the statute by its express terms does not 
apply to withdra\vn or reserved federal lands. /( orf v. 
Ittcn, 169 Pac. 14H (Colo.) (1917); Stofferan v. Olcano-
g.an C ottnty, 136 Pac. 484 (Wash.) ( 1913). 
Secondly, it iH clear that the federal offer for high-
way rights-of-way must be accepted in the 1nanner pro-
vided for by state law, and in the State of Utah the offer 
can only be accepted by official dedication ( \Vhich \ve do 
not have here) (see Para. 6 of Findings), or by continu-
ous use for a period of ten years. In this regard, Section 
27-1-2, U.C.A. 1953, provides: 
" ... a high,vay shall be deemed and taken as 
dedicated, and abandoned to the use of the public, 
when it has been continuously· and uninterruptedly 
used as a public thoroughfare, for a period of ten 
years." 
This Court has held that the federal offer may be 
accepted by the public in such a manner (ten years of 
use) without formal action by public authorities : 
"It has been held by numerous courts that the 
grant [Section 932] may be accepted by public 
use without formal action by public authorities, 
and that the continued use of the road by the pub-
lic for such length of time and under such circum-
stances as to clearly indicate an intention on the 
part of the public to accept the grant is sufficient." 
Lindsay Land .and Livestock Co. v. Churnos, 75 
l 1tah 384, 285 Pac. 646 (1929). 
But, this Court has also given effect to the clear 
mandate of the Utah Statute, which requires a ten-year 
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period of use before the public can establish any right 
of use: 
"Under this statute (Section 27-1-2) the high-
way, even though it be over privately owned 
ground will be deemed dedicated or abandoned 
to the public use when the public has continuously 
u.sed i·t as a thoronghfar·e for a period of 10 years, 
but such use rnust be by the public. Use under 
private right is not sufficient. If the thoroughfare 
is laid out or used as a private way, its use, how-
ever long, as a private "\vay, does not make it a 
public way; and the mere fact that the public 
also makes use of it, without objection from the 
owner of the land, will not make it a public "\vay . 
. . . " Morris v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 161 Pac. 1127 
( 1960). (Emphasis added.) 
This is in complete accord with Elliott, whose work 
on Roads and Streets has often been quoted by this 
Court. Typical statements from Elliott are quoted belo"r: 
"A private way may, doubtless, be trans-
formed into a public one but in order that this 
may result without legal proceedings it must ap-
pear that the owner fully consented to the change, 
or there must be some element of estoppel to 
deprive him of his rights as the o"rner of the fee. 
Where a "\vay is laid out as a private "~ay, the 
mere fact that the publie also make use of it 'vith-
out objection fron1 the O\vner 'viii not 1nake it a 
public \Yay.'' Elliott, Roads and Streets, 4th Ed., 
Sec. 4. 
'~Whether a private \Yay is transfarmed into 
a public one 1nust generally be determined on the 
facts of the particular ea8e. The fact that the "\vay 
has been a private 'vay does not prevent the public 
fro1n gaining a right h~T prescription, but it may 
1nake it neef1ssar~~ to exa1nine "\vith care the alleged 
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public usP. '' Elliott, Roads and Streets, 4th Ed., 
Sec. 5. 
Hit is generally held, however, that where the 
\vay is originally laid out and used merely as a 
private way for the use of the landowner, its use 
by the public as "\veil does not necessarily make 
it a highway, especially if the owner keeps it up 
and the public use is not clearly hostile, or under 
claim that it is public for the statutory period." 
Elli'Ott, Roads and Streets, 4th Ed., Sec. 6. 
The access road has not been used for tPn years un-
der circumstances satisfying the statute, but has only 
been used for approximately three years, and this has 
been on a permissive basis: 
·~The United States Bureau of Reclamation 
has indicated that it intends to permit the public 
to use the road until 1962 or 1963, when certain 
portions of the access road \vill be innundated as 
a result of impounding water behind Flan1ing 
Gorge Dam. The access road has no'v been used 
by the general public for approximately three 
years.'' (Para. 12, Findings of Fact). 
Thu~, there has been no dedication by continuous 
public use because (a) the statutory period of ten years 
has not been satisfied, (b) the use has been permissive 
and could not establi~h a dedication however long con-
tinued, and (c) the public lands involved are reserved 
and 'vithdra"\\·n and are therefore exempt from the statu-
tory offer (Sec. 932). 
(d) The Contract Executed by the Bureau of Reclamation 
with Petitioner did not have the Effect of Granting to the Public 
Rights in Federal Land. 
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The contract provisions bet\veen the Bureau of Re-
clamation and this petitioner could not have had the 
effect of granting to the public any "rights" in federal 
land. The power to grant or 'vithhold rights in federal 
land is by Article \i'I, Sec. 3 of the United States Consti-
tution vested in Congress. As is de1nonstrated by the 
above authorities, the power of Congress to grant or 
withhold rights in federal land is almost without limita-
tion, and rights cannot be obtained in federal land except 
by authority of Congress through its own enactments or 
through its express delegation of authority to federal 
agencies (See page 15 of this brief). There is no fed-
eral statute granting to the lTnited States Bureau of 
Reclamation the power to dedicate highways across forest 
lands. On forest lands, as we have argued above, the pro-
cedure for granting a right-of-,vay for roads is governed 
by Section 525, Title 16, U.S.C. It is stipulated (para. 14 
of Findings of Fact) that there has been no dedication 
by any official act of any federal agency. And Section 
932, Title 43, by its express terms does not apply to with-
drawn lands. There is a clearly established method for 
the state or publie to acquire rights for a road on with-
drawn lands. It is prescribed by 43 Code of Federal Reg-
ulations, Sec. 2-!4.59. 
It 1night be 'Yell before diseussing this procedure to 
note the statutor~T po"Ter under \\Thich lands may be 
withdrawn for recla1nation purpose~. The basic statute 
was enacted June 25, 1910 (36 Stat. 847 ~ 43 lT.S.C. 141-
143). Section 1-ll provide~ that the President 1nay "\Yith-
draw '' fron1 ~rttle1n0nt location, ~ale or Pntry~ any of the 
public land~ ... a11d re~erve the ~a1ue for 'Yater po,yer 
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::5ites, irrigation ... or other public purposes,'' and the 
'vithdra,val shall rPinain in force until revoked by hi1n. 
It is uniformly held that the effect of such a 'vithdra,val 
is Hto sever such lands from public domain." TVilcox v. 
Jackson, (1839) 13 Pet. 498, 10 L.Ed. 264. 
It \vas stipulated by paragraph 6 of the findings that 
these lands were so withdrawn for reclamation purposes 
incident to the construction of the Flaming Gorge Dam. 
When lands are so withdrawn, rights of way for high-
ways may only be acquired in accorda~ce with Section 
244.59, Title 43 of the ·Code of Federal ~egulations. It is 
.. 
provided therein in part as follows : 
"§244.59. Procedure when reserved land is 
involved; ... (a) When a right-of-way is desired 
for the construction of a highway under R.S. 2-t-77, 
over public land reserved for public uses, and such 
reserved land is under the jurisdiction of the De-
partment of the Interior, ... an application should 
be 1nade in accordance 'vith § 244.3 .... 
~'(b) Where reserved lands are· involved, no 
rights to establish or construct the highway will be 
acquired by reason of the filing of such applica-
tion, unless and until the reservation shall have 
been revoked or modified so as to permit construc-
tion of the high\vay, ~ubject to such terms and 
conditions, if any, as may be deemed reasonable 
and necessary for the adequate protection and 
utilization of the· reserve." 
Even the state or political subdivisions must file -
see Sec. 244.3, C.F .R. 
The stipulation here that there has been no official 
act of the federal government or any of its agencies 
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demonstrates that as to these lands which are reserved 
there simply can not be any ''right" acquired by the pub-
lic in these lands. The federal govern1nent has permitted 
the public to use the land, but the use is permissive. It 
is not a use "as a matter of right," as is required by 
our Utah statute in question, ( 41-1-19, U.C.A. 1953). Thus, 
the making of a contract with the petitioner to build the 
Flaming Gorge Dam, and as an incident thereof, to com-
plete the construction of and maintain this access road, 
does not follow the prescribed procedure for the estab-
lishment of a right-of-,vay for a road on reserved lands, 
and the parties have stipulated that there is no official 
dedication by any federal agency. 
The second reason why the contract between the Bu-
reau of Reclamation and this petitioner would not have 
the effect of granting rights in the federal land is that 
the contract provisions do not by their terms even pur-
port to have this effect. To the contrary, the construction 
contract merely provides that the access road may be 
used by the contractor in the construction of the dan1, 
and that: 
'' ... the contractor's use of the road shall not 
infringe on or in1peril free public use of the road 
for normal traYel purpose~." (I>aragraph 7, Find-
ings) (Paragraph -!Oa, Ex. A, the Contract.) 
The contract then recite~ Pxpres~J~~ that: 
'"The acee~s road i~ ou·ned by the govern1nent 
and is aYailable for the n~e of the contractor in 
perfor1ning thP \\~ork required by these specifica-
tions.'' (Paragraph -t-S. Ex . .t\) ( emphasi ~ added). 
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Thus, the contract, \vhile requiring the contractor 
not to interfere ,,·ith the perrnissive use by the public, 
expressly reeites that the road is ~' ow·ned" hy the United 
States, that it is available for "use'' by the contractor, 
\vith the perrnission of the United States, \vhile the con-
tractor is ~~perforn1ing the work," and the public may 
use the road for normal purposes, but no "right" is ac-
kno,vledge in the contractor, or the public, or in the State 
of l Ttah, or in anyone ·else. The contract explicitly says 
that the road is "otoned" by the United States. Cer-
tainly this language - even if a contract such as this 
could legally have that effect - is not a dedication of 
the roadway, nor a relinquishment of rights of federal 
o\vnership. 
In fact, the very purpose for withdrawing the land 
from public entry under the reclamation withdrawal is 
to protect the government's interest in the land against 
private entry. This was necessary, or at least desired, 
so that the government could carry into fulfillment the 
purpose for \vhich the land \Vas withdrawn, to-\vit, the 
building of the dam and the inundation of much of the 
land. It \vould be incredible to assume under the stipu-
lated facts of this case that the United States would dedi-
cate the access road to public use and thereby grant to 
the public the use of the road "as a matter of right." 
The only purpose for constructing the access road was 
to make it possible to build the Flaming Gorge Dam. 
In planning the route for the access road, the United 
States knew that in 1962 or 1963 : 
~ '. . . certain portions of the access road will 
be inundated as a result of impounding water be-
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hind Flaming Gorge Dam (as shown on Exhibit 
B)." (Paragraph 12, Findings.) 
Reason dictates that the United States would not 
dedicate the access road to public use and thereby create 
in the public rights which certainly must be destroyed 
within a few years when parts of the road are inundated. 
To prevent the creation of a public road \\Thich could be 
used "as a matter of right" and to prevent all other en-
tries, the land was withdra,vn - severed from the public 
domain - and rights could only be acquired therein by 
following the requirements of the Code of Federal Regu-
lations quoted above. 
The contract reciting that the road is '"owned" by 
the lTnited States and is ''available" for use by the con-
tractor, who is not to interfere with normal travel by the 
public, simply could not relinquish "rights" in these fed-
eral reserved or withdrawn lands. The use is per1nissive 
-not as a ''matter of right," and "\\7hen the dam is finish-
ed the road will be flooded and no one has any "right" 
which would entitle him to co1nplain. 
(e) Even if the Utah Statutes Defining Public Roads and 
Private Roads were Applicable to Federal Land, this would not 
be a Public Road within the Utah statutes. 
As is noted in the Argu1nent above, Congress has the 
exclusive po,ver to create rights in these lands because 
they are federally o\vned. Because of this, the decisions 
and statutes of t hP federal rourts are controlling. The 
Utah statutes could not havP the effect of granting the 
public right~ in thPsr lanrls_ hut even if they could, this 
\vould not be a public road "Tithin the lTtah statutes. 
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Section 41-6-18, TJ.C.A. 1953 recites: 
~'Nothing in this act shall be construed to pre-
vent the owner of real property ~used by the public 
for purposes of vehicular travel by per1nission 
of the owner and not as matter of right from pro-
hibiting such use, or from requiring other or dif-
ferent or additional conditions than those speci-
fied in this act, or otherwise regulating such use 
as may seem best to such owner." (emphasis add-
ed) 
Further, 41-6-7, U.C.A. 1953, \vhich contains several 
definitions of terms used in Title 41 on ~Iotor 'T ehicles, 
states that a street or highway is: 
"The entire \vidth between the boundary lines 
of every \vay publicly maintained when any part 
thereof is open to the use of the public for pur-
poses of vehicular travel." (emphasis added.) 
The sa1ne sectian then states that a private road is: 
"Every way or place in private ownership and 
nsed for vehicular travel by the owner, and those 
having express or implied permission from the 
owner, but not by other persons." (emphasis 
added.) 
In construing provisions of the Oregon Code identical 
to the above quoted provisions of the Utah Code, the 
Federal District Court in Oregon declared: 
"The court is still of the opinion that the 
rules of the road as they appear in the Uniform 
Traffic Act of the State of Oregon were not in-
tended to be, and are not applicable upon a road 
constructed and maintained by the United States 
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situated wholly upon lands owned by the United 
States as part of the public domain. The court 
is further of the opinion that the road in question 
was a 'private road' as defined by the Code if it be 
assumed that such a statute could by any stretch 
of the irnagination be conceived applicable to a 
road upon lands of ""hich the United States was 
the sole proprietor although the same were \vithin 
the boundaries of the state of Oregon. 
"Whether or not the statutes of that State be 
so construed, these were not applicable to the 
present situation. The United States upon land 
of which it is the proprietor has complete power 
to exclude all persons therefrom, to issue special 
permits to certain persons to go thereon, to con-
struct roads and prescribe the manner in which 
they shall be used, and \Yho shall use them. The 
State of Oregon has no po\ver \Vhatsoever to pre-
scribe the rules upon, or methods of use of any 
such road. The right to prescribe such rules and 
limit the persons licensed to use such roads upon 
lands owned either b~,. private individuals or by 
the Federal Government. is a part of the owner-
ship of the soil. The lTnited States exercises this 
right, not only on forest reserves~ but in military 
reservations and in national parks. (citing au-
thority)" King v. Edu·ard Hinzes Lz11nber Cont-
pany, 68 F. Supp. 1019 (D:C. Oregon, 1946). ( en1-
phasis added) 
POINT IV. 
TAX STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST 
THE STATE AND IN FAVOR OF THE TAXPAYER. 
If therP nrP nn~· rPn~onahle donht~ or ~nnbigui6e~ 
as to "·hether lieen~e and regi~tration taxe~ should be 
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11nposed upon petitioner~s vehicles using the access road, 
it is submitted that all doubts rnust be resolved in favor 
of the taxpayer (Pacific Intermountain J~).rpress v. State 
71a.r ConZJnission, 8 Utah 2d 144, 329 P. 2d 650 (1958). 
But petitioner contends that its vehicles used upon 
the access road are so clearly exempt from registration 
and license fees that there are no doubts or ambiguities. 
Further, all equities in this case are in favor of petitioner 
taxpayer. 
The State of -utah did not contribute to the construc-
tion of the access road. It is not contributing to the main-
tenance of the road. Registration and license fees are 
assessed for the purpose of constructing and maintaining 
the public highways of the state. It is logical that they 
should be exacted only on vehicles which are using the 
public highways. Yet, respondent wants to impose license 
and registraton fees on vehicles of petitioner which are 
driven only on the access road, and never at any time 
go upon the highways constructed and maintained by 
the State. 
\V e are not complaining because of the sums spent in 
In the construction of the road or in its maintenance. 
These are contractual obligations which the petitioner 
agreed to perform, but we never expected to be required 
to pay registration and license fees on a road not con-
stnlcted or n1aintained by the State. We do not be-
lieve that the statute contemplates the assessment of the 
registration and license fees because the access road 
is not a highway within the meaning. of the statute. 
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Section 41-1-19, U.C.A. 1953, imposes registration 
and license fees only upon vehicles moved upon the pub-
lic highways. A road, to be a highway, must be open to 
the public and used by the public "as a matter of right." 
It has been stipulated here that the road traverses 
lands which are federally owned. Since it is federally 
owned land, the federal cases are controlling. The United 
States Supreme Court has held repeatedly that under 
Article I,:, Section 3, Clause 2 of the lTnited States Con-
stitution, the power of ·Congress over federal lands is 
exclusive, and that Congress Inust exercise this power 
in some form before rights of any kind can be acquired 
therein. It has been stipulated here that there has been 
no official act of dedication by any federal agency. 
It also has been stipulated that the lands here in-
volved are reserved or withdrawn lands, with part being 
included in the Ashley National Forest, and the remain-
der having been "~ithdra\Yn for reclan1ation purposes. 
The forest lands are specifically controlled by Section 
525, Title 16, lT nited States Code, and there has been no 
effort 1nade to con1ply \Yith the rongres~ional 1nandates 
of that section. The only general rongressional authority 
for acquiring rights in federal lands for roads is Section 
932, Title -l-3, United State~ Code. By it~ express ter1ns, 
this section does not apply to reserved or withdrawn 
lands. The procedure for acquiring roads across reserved 
lands is pr0~cribed by the Code of Federal Regulations, 
and again, this procedure has not been followed. It 
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thus is conclusively established that Congress has not re-
linquished any federal ownership rights in these lands, 
and the public is not using the road "'as a 1natter of 
right." 
The contract between the petitioner and the Bureau 
of Reclamation could not as a matter of law circu1nvent 
these federal statutory requiren1ents, and as a matter of 
fact, the contract does not purport to do so. To the 
contrary, it expressly recites that the road is" owned" by 
the United States, but is available for use by the con-
tractor to build the dam. Parts of the road will be inun-
dated \Vhen the dam is completed. Therefore, the vehicles 
owned by the petitioner and primarily used to haul sand 
and gravel from the agregate plant to the dam site are 
not being used upon a public highway. r~ehe road is being 
maintained by the petitioner, is used by it to build the 
dam, and it is not a public highway. The determination 
by respondent was erroneous and should, therefore, be 
reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLYDE & MECHAM 
By: EDWARD W. CLYDE 
RICHARD L. DEWSNUP 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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